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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CRYSTAL LIME AND CEMENT
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 8948

GOLDEN W. ROBBINS and HARRIET J. K. ROBBINS, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

PETITIOJ\ OF RESPONDENTS AND
DEFE~DANTS

FOR RE-HEARING

TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH:
Golden W. Robbins and Harriet .J. K. Robbins, defendants and respondents, request a re-hearing in the
above entitled cause upon the following grounds:
1
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I

The Supreme Court erroneously and inadvertantly
stated that respondents in their counterclaim asked for
reimbursement.
"That in the event title was not quieted in
them, that appellant herein be required to reimburse them the amount they expended for taxes."
II

The Supreme Court did not take into consideration
the fact that it had become the law of the case that respondents were not entitled to recover on their counterclaim, and the counterclaim was not part of the case when
ren1anded to the District Court.
III

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial
court on grounds and argun1ents not presented in appellant's Brief.

IV
The Supre1ne Court, b)~ judicial decision, has rendered Rule 41 (b) n1eaningless.

v
This decision is eontrary to the law laid down by
this court in previous tax title cases, without specifically
overruling those cases.
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VI
Respondents could not obtain the relief to which they
were entitled and their only remedy was to ask for a
dismissal.

VII
By the decision this court has for the second time
directed the lower eourt to do that which this court heretofore ordered, which order was carried out by the lower
court but not complied with by appellant.

VIII
The Supreme Court has substituted its discretion for
the discretion of the trial court.
The respondents respectfully submit that as to all
and each of the above grounds, the mistake and error
of the court was decisive in resulting in the decision reversing the order of the trial court and resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.
MILTON

v.

wILLIAM
GoLDEN

BACKMAN

H.

W.

HENDERSON
RoBBINS

Attorneys for the Respondents
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We, Milton V. Backman, William H. Henderson,
and Golden W. Robbins do hereby certify that we are the
attorneys for the defendants and respondents, petitioners
in the above entitled action. That we have carefully
examined the decision herein and in our opinion there is
good reason to believe that the judgment is erroneous
and should be re-examined.

ll2~--r~·
/)t(~IJI - - - - - -

/~--------------~
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUPREME COURT ERRONEOUSLY AND INADVER'l'ANTLY STATED THAT RESPONDENTS IN THEIR
COUNTERCLAIM ASKED FOR REIMBURSEMENT:
"THAT IN THE EVENT TITLE WAS NOT
QUIETED IN THEM, THAT APPELLANT HEREIN
BE REQUIRED TO REIMBURSE THEM THE
AMOUNT THEY EXPENDED FOR TAXES."

The Supreme Court erroneously and inadvertantly
stated that Respondents in their counterclaim asked,
"That in the event title was not quieted in
them, that appellant herein be required to reimburse them the amount they expended for taxes."
From an examination of the pleadings it will appear
there is no such allegation in any of respondents' pleadIngs.
The inadvertance and error in saying that respondents asked for reimbursernent is decisively important in
the court's decision reversing the trial court.
Not only is the above quotation from the court's opinion an erroneous statement of the fact, but the implication from the quotation that reimbursernent is properly
a subject of counterclain1 is directly in conflict with
numerous V tah cases, holding that reirnbursernent is
part of the relief that will be administered by the l'ourt
as a condition precedent to quieting title in plaintiff.
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Reimbursement is sometimes considered as part of
plaintiff's complaint. In any event, it is a condition imposed before any relief is granted to plaintiff, and a condition to plaintiff's right to relief.
The defendant could not maintain an action either
in law or equity to collect the taxes paid. It is so held
in the case of Reeve v. Blatchley, 106 L. 259, 147 P. 2d 861
and on page 862, bottom of the 2nd column, we quote:
"The right to reimbursement for taxes paid
does not exist at law, even in favor of the original
tax title purchaser, Anson v. Ellison, L"tah, 140
P. 2d 653: 37 Cyc. 1537; Colley on Taxation, 4th
Ed., Sec. 1553, and cases there cited. But in equity
this right in the original purchaser has been recognized to a limited extent. Cases cited supra.
See also Holland v. I-Iotchkiss, 162 Cal. 366, 123
P. 258, L.R. A. 1915C. -19:2, and annotation thereto.
An original action will not lie in equity~ any more
than in law, to collect such payment or to impress
a lien on the property therefor. Anson v. Ellison,
supra; 26 R.C.L. p. 463: Joliet Stove \Yks. v. Kiep,
230 Ill. 530. s;~ X.E. S/5. 1:2 Ann. Cas. 221 and
note; Colley on Taxation, Yol. -t Sec. 1553 and
1556, -1-th Ed .. and ea~es cited. Greenwood v.
Admns, SO Cal. 1-t :21 P. 113-1. But son1e courts
of equity. this jurisdiction anwng then1, have held
that they will )lOt quiet the owner's title until he
reimhnr~P~ f11e other party for the taxes paid by
him. Bolognese v. ~\ndPrson. supra: Anson v.
Ellison, ~upra. Thi~ i~ upon the basis that he who
~PPk~ equity nmst do t'qnity.''
( >n pag<' S();{. :2nd eoluum in the :2nd paragraph we
quote:
6
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"This is further evidenced by the fact that
if the owner refuses to reimburse the tax title
claimant, the court does not quiet title in claimant,
nor does it enter a judgment for the amount in his
favor. The court just refuses its decree in favor
of the owner, and leaves the parties where it
found them."
And further on page 866 the court holds that there
is no lien and we quote as follows:
"From what has been said it follows that the
tax title claimant, Miller, does not acquire a lien
on the property, for the rnonies he paid to remove
the county's tax lien, and the court was in error
in declaring a lien and ordering a sale of the property to satisfy the same; it alsQ follows that the
court should not enter the decree quieting title in
the owners (Reeve et al.) until they repay to
Miller the full amount paid to the county on account of its tax claims, with interest."
We particularly think that the court inadvertantly
overlooked this fact because the court cited the above
quoted case of Reeve v. Blatchley, in its opinion.
It is apparent from the language in the case of
Bolognese v. Anderson, 49 P. 2d 1034, 87 Utah 455, that
this court considered reimbursement as rnore a part of
plaintiff's cause of action and certainly was not even
an affirmative defense. We quote from page 1035 of
the Pacific Reporter :
"We did not mean in that opinion to lay down
any rule which would or would not require an

7
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allegation and a proffer of the taxes by any party
asking to have title quieted in him as against a
person claiming title by virtue of a tax deed,·
whether such party be a plaintiff or a defendant.
That n1atter may well be taken care of by a court
of equity if it detennines that the holder of the
tax title has not a good title and that the other
party is the real owner, by, as a matter of equity
in proper cases, requiring the real owner to pay
the holder of the invalid tax deed the amount of
taxes with interest and penalties which he has
paid, or the amount of taxes together with interest and penalties which may have been due to the
county. It \Yas thus held in Oregon Short Line
R. Co. v. Hallock, 41 Utah 378, 126 P. 394."
The case of F.isher ~·. Wright, 123 P. 2d 703, 101
is one in which an action was brought to foreclose a tax lien, and the court held that there was no tax
lien. On the botton1 of page ·706 2nd Column and at the
top of page 707 the court says :

r tah 469,

'•The ea:5e of Shipp v. Sheffield, ITtal1, 117
P. 2d 996, 997, does not hold that the purchaser
has a lien. It 1nerelv states : 'In so far as an' tax
liens rnav Pxist. i{ there are anY,' etc. (italics
added), t1nls }paving the matter u1~decided and in
doubt. rrhe Shipp ease holds that Fisher, if he
eoncludes to eease paying taxes. cannot, therefore, requirP payment of that which he has paid,
atrainst the '\Yrig·hts or their g-rantees. If he conel~tdP~ to e<.mtin~Ie to pay ta~es he 1nay have to
wait indefinite!~· for the 'y rights again to be('.ollH' thP HC'tor~ a~ tlH':'-. were in the previous suit.
IIi~ dilemma is JWrplexing but we are unable to
help hint. ~or C'an the fad that the ";rights stipu-
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lated that he could foreclose 'his lien on said lands,
for the taxes in the 1nanner provided by law,' help
him when he has no lien to foreclose nor any
manner provided by law for foreclosing a lien
which does not exist."
The above case shows that there is no tax lien. It
also shows the position that the respondent was put in.
And it shows why Rule 41 (b) should be invoked.
Under these cases the respondent did not have a lien,
did not have any affirmative act he could do other than
to ask for a dismissal.
POINT II
THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT IT HAD BECOME THE LAW OF THE
CASE THAT RESPONDENTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO
RECOVER ON THEIR COUNTERCLAIM, AND THE .CO UNTERCLAIM WAS NOT PART OF THE CASE WHEN REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT.

The court says at the top of page 3 of its opinion:
"Respondents' contentions might be very persuasive if they had not filed counterclaim in the
action asking that title be quieted in them."
The court is correct in saying that a counterclain1
was filed in the action, but the counterclaim was eliminated by the decision of the District Court and by the
decision of the Supre1ne Court. The only thing remanded
to the District Court for further proceedings was to
quiet title in appellant subject to its reimbursing the
respondents which appellant did not do. rrhe ('Olllltt'l'claim was eliminated by the two decisions.
9
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POINT III
THE SUPREME COURT REVERSED THE ORDER OF
THE TRIAL COURT ON GROUNDS AND ARGUMENT NOT
PRESENTED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF.

In the case at bar, this court in reversing the trial
court, ruled against "respondents' contention that the
court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing, with
prejudice, appellant's action under the provisions of
Rule 41 (b)," stating:
"Respondent's contentions might be very persuasive if they had not filed counter-claims in the
action, asking that title be quieted in them, and
also asking that in the event title ·was not quieted
in them, that Appellant herein be required to reimburse them the amounts they expended for
taxes. In asking for such affirmative relief, they
were in effect, cross complainants in the action."
Respondents have searched and re-searched Appellant's Brief, and cannot find where Appellant made this
point or argument. It appears that the point was volunteered by the court.
It is a cardinal principle of appellate jurisdiction,
everywhere recognizt>d, that an appellate court will not
search the record and undertake to inYestigate and discover error upon whieh to rPYl~r~e the decision of the
trial court. All intendn1ents are in favor of the trial
court's judg1nent, :lnd the burden is upon an appellant
to point out ~ueh PtTor in it~ lwid·~ upon which it believes
the appellatP court must reverse the trial court.

10
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5 O.J.S. Sec. 1803, page 1230
"The appellate court will not examine the
record in a search for prejudicial errors which
are not clearly pointed out and insisted on in the
brief of the complaining party, and all such errors
may be considered as waived."
3 Am. Juris., page 330, Sec. 764, et seq.
This court has consistently adhered to this principle.

8andall v. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 P. 1093, 1095,
15 A.L.R. 620.
"Many other errors are assigned, but they
are not referred to in appellant's brief; others
are argued in the brief but were not assigned;
others raise questions not presented in the court
below; and, finally, others allege insufficiency of
the evidence to authorize a modification of the
decree without specifying the particulars wherein
the evidence is insufficient and without incorporating any of the evidence in the record.
Such omissions and commissions on the part
of appellant are in disregard of the rules of practice of this court and have been condemned by
the decisions of the court in every case with which
we are familiar wherein the objection has been
seasonably made and relied on. To cite all the
cases so holding would require more space than
ought to be accorded an entire opinion in an
ordinary case. We cite a few, however, as a gentle
reminder: Walker v. Cont. Ins. Co., 2 Utah 331;
People v. Peacock, 5 Utah 237, 14 Pac. 332; Herriman Irr.. Co. v. Keel, 25 Utah 96, 69 Pac. 719;
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Warren v. Robinson et al., 25 Utah 205, 70 Pac.
989; Beatty v. Shelly, ±2 Utah 593, 132 Pac. 1160;
Egelund v. Fayter, and cases cited, 51 Utah 579,
172 Pac. 313; I-Iolt v. Great Eastern Casualty Co.,
173 Pac. 1168."
See also Aikens v. Les Taylor Motor Co., 171 P. 2d
page 676, 678, 110 U. 265, and Felkner v. Smith, 296 P.
776, 77 U. 410, Headnote 3, 74 A.L.R. 124.
The reason for the rule is aptly stated in 3 Am. Juris
P. 333, Sec. 770.
"Such 'a rule is not made for the pupose, alone,
of enabling the court easily and readily to appreciate and understand the errors complained of,
but for the larger reason of enabling counsel
on the other side to know what points are relied
on, and what is urged as error 1·n the action of
the co·urt." (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents request an opportunity to answer the
point. Appellant is represented by able counsel, thoroughly familiar with the record who would 1nost certainly have advanced the point had they considered it had
merit. We respectfully sub1nit that advance1nent and reliance of the point by tllis court was by inadvertance.
The limitations of tin1e on petitions for rehearing do not
pennit full argtunent on the lack of 1nerit on the point,
but the other grounds for rehearing, herein urged, clearly
indi<'a te it. Further, re~polHient~ sub1nit, after re1nittiture
it was appellaut's action and complaiut upon which
judgment \Yas rendered. A~ herein aboYe stated, there
was no counterclain1 h~~ rP~pondPnt~ for reiinburseinent,
as reimburse1nent i~ not a subjeet of counterclain1, but
12
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1s part of the limitations of the plaintiff's cause. Respondents' counterclailn or cross-complaint (however
viewed b~· the court) for quieting title, had been decided
against respondents and was out of the cause when the
case was rernanded. Consequently, it was plaintiJff's
action and complaint, only, which was before the trial
court for over eight years, for rendering of judgment
in accordance with the judgment of the Suprerne Court;
it was "plaintiff's acti,on and Complaint" only that was
dismissed by the trial court.
We think it is reasonable to assmne that appellant
did not argue this point because it realized that the only
claim that was before the trial court for the eight years
after the prior decision by the Supreme Court, was appellant's claim of quiet title subject to the equitable duty
to reimburse respondents. If appellant had made such
contention, respondents could have fully briefed the matter and prevented the mistake of the court in stating
that respondents had counterclaimed for reimbursement
It seems apparent, therefore, that the Supreme Court's
departure from the briefs, together with its apparent
mistake with respect to the record, was decisive in the
reversal of the decision of the trial court.
POINT IV
THE SUPREME COURT BY JUDICIAL DECISION HAS
RENDERED RULE 41 (b) MEANINGLESS.

Respondents subrnit that this court will agree that
Rule 41 (b) should not be encircled by an initial judicia]
interpretation that will render it ineffective, if not rnean-
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---------------ingless. Respondents respectfully submit that the court
has, inadvertantly, by its decision in the case at bar, done
that very thing.
In reversing the trial court's order dismissing plaintiff's claim against defendants under Rule 41 (b) the
court states:
"Respondents further contend that Rule 41
(b) applies to plaintiff and not defendants who
fail to prosecute or comply with an order of the
court and that this rule is enacted for the benefit
of defendants to save them annoyance and harassment by the plaintiffs who file suit but fail to
prosecute them with diligence or refuse to obey
the rules and orders of the court."
As has been stated above, the court then goes on to
say that Respondents contentions nright be very persuasive if they had not counterclaimed. The particular points
dealing ·with respondents' counterclaim have been dealt
with in respondents' previous points for Petition for
Re-Hearing.
Respondents desire to call the court's attention to its
statement that respondents contend that the rule .. ,vas
enacted for the benefit of defendants to saYe then1 annoyance and harass1nent b~- plaintiffs who file suits but
fail to prosecute the1n." r:rhe court thereafter goes on to
hold that defendant~ cannot reasonably argue that they
wPre harassed and annoyed when respondents could have
drawn and presented to the court findings and judgments

14
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granting them the amounts they claimed. (As respondents have noted in their first grounds in the Petition for
Re-Hearing, Respondents did not claim reimbursmnent
in their counterclairn.)
Respondents respectfully subrnit such ruling is unrealistic and destructive of Rule -U (b). The purpose of
the rule is one thing, (and of course best known by the
Supreme Court), the prov,isions of the rule are another.
And the rule specifically provides for dismissal, ''for
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute" without regard to
harassment, and this was the ground of Respondents'
rnotion. The harassment, in this cause, was appellant's
motions to disrniss, the antithes,is of prosecution, and
these motions constituted a deliberate declaration that
appellant did not desire to prosecute its claim. Consequently, the harassment constituted an aggrevated violation of Rule 41 (b).
Respondents further submit that the court's denial
of the right of the trial court to disrniss this action because defendants "had it in their power at all times to
obtain relief" by presenting findings and decree to the
court for signing and because "any party to this action
could have obtained the relief to which it was entitled
at any time it wanted." is further destructive of Rule
41(b).
Let us assume for the purpose of argurnent that
respondents could have presented findings and judgment

15
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providing for final judg1nent quieting title in appellant,
subject to payment of reimbursement by appellant to
respondents.

It is generally true that either party (a defendant
or plaintiff without regard to whether a counterclaim
or cross-cmnplaint is involved) Inay push an action to
trial and to its conclusion; and after oral announcement
of judgnwnt is 1nade, 1nay draw and present the judgment and findings to the court if the opposing party fails
to do so. Certainly, if the power of a defendant to push
or "prosecute" a plaintiff's claim to hearing and final
determination, including preparation and presentation of
an adverse judgment is to constitute a test of ·whether
a trial court has discretion to dismiss a plaintiff's claim
for lack of prosecution, there is little, if any, force and
effect in Rule 41 (b).

Further, by its interpretation, the Supre1ne Court's
decision seems at variance with the specific language of
the rule. The Supren1e Court ruled that respondents'
contentions, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, might '"be very persuasiYe" had not the respondents
counterclai1ned or cross-complained. The court's decision thus appears to li1nit the power of the trial court to
dis1niss if defendant i:::~ in effect a cro:::~s-cmnplainant; or,
as applied to the ea:::~e at bar. a di8mit'sal of the plaintiff's
complaint for failun• to prosecute will constitute an abuse
of discertion if defendant has cro8s-eomplained.

16
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This construction seerns to ignore the specific language of the rule \vhich provides that a defendant may
n1ove for a disn1issal of any dairn against hirn, and which
1nakes no exception or distinction if the defendant has
cross-complained.
It appears to respondents that the clear intent of
the rule is that defendant rnay move to dismiss plaintiff's action and cmnplaint without regard to whether defendant has cross-complained. This appears clear from
the provisions of Rule 41 (b) and (c).
'"Rule 41 (b) Involuntary Dismissal. Effect
Thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute
or to comply with these rules or any order of
court, a defendant HUl~' 1nove for dismissal of an
action or of any claim against hirn."
"Rule 41 (c) Dismissal of Counterclaim, CrossClaim, or Third-Party Claim. The provision of
this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim."
Respondents submit: A trial court's power to dismiss for failure to prosecute is extren1ely limited if the
filing of a cross-complaint so restricts it.
It would appear clearly frmn the provisions of the
rule as quoted above that a ('Olnplaint and a cross-complaint must each stand on its own feet; that defendant
may disrniss plaintiff's action and complaint if plaintiff
faih; to prosecute; and that plaintiff might \H'll dismiss
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defendant's cross-complaint if defendant fails to prosecute it. This particular point, of course, is not involved
in the case at bar. As stated in the previous grounds
for re-hearing, the only cause of action before the trial
court upon remand was plaintiff's complaint and action
for quiet title subject to the equitable duty to pay reimbursement.

POINT V
THIS DEtCISION IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW LAID
DOWN BY THIS COURT IN PREVIOUS TAX TITLE CASES
WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY OVERRULING THOSE CASES.

The court says on page 3 of its opinion at the bottom
of the first paragraph,
"Then if appellant failed to pay these amounts
within such reasonable time as ordered by the
court, the court could quiet title in respondents."
We believe that the court erroneously and inadvertantly made such a rule of law. Tlris matter \Yas not discussed in either Brief nor n1entioned by either counsel.
We think that if the point had been fully briefed and
considered by the court, that the court would have discussed the cases above cited in this Brief, and would
have either affir1ned or ~pec-ifieally overruled them.
POINT VI
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POINT VI
RESPONDENTS COULD NOT OBTAIN THE RELIEF
TO WHICH THEY WERE ENTITLED AND THEIR ONLY
REMEDY WAS TO ASK FOR A DISMISSAL.

Under the cases cited under Point I, respondents
were not entitled to a money judgment. They were not
entitled to have the taxes paid by thern declared a lien
on the property. All they could do was to wait for appellant to pay them. There was no affirmative action the
respondents could take other than asking for a dismissal
of the case.
What are respondents' rights if the plaintiff fails
to proceed j? Judge Wolfe sums it up in the case of
Toronto v. Sheffield, 2:22 P. 2d 59-1 at page 601, 118 Utah
460.
"Where he brings the action, he asks for a
judgment quieting title, and thus judgment nmy be
granted on condition of his repaying the money
paid out by the purchasers of the tax title for the
benfit of the tax debtor owner. But even here,
the owner may decide that he would rather forego
his decree than pay the money and in such a case
the purchaser of the tax title would be helpless
when it came to obtaining recouprnent."
On page 603 Judge Wolfe further says:
"But if the defendant did not pay, the finding
would repose in the records of the clerk's office
but there would be no decree. The plaintiff could
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not obtain a decree because it was shown that the
defendant was really the title holder; neither
could he obtain recoupment for the money he paid
for the invalid tax title or such part as the defendant should pay because the taxes in respect to
which he had defaulted had by the tax title purchaser in effect been paid, at least the lien for
taxes discharged."
We think that the court inadvertantly held and stated
in its opinion,
"Any party to this action could have obtained
the relief to which it was entitled any time it
wanted.''
unless the court intended by the foregoing statement to
overrule the cases set out in Point I, and disegard and
disagree with that which Judge Wolfe stated in the case
of Toronto v. Sheffield, supra.
POINT VII
BY THE DECISION THIS COURT HAS FOR THE SECOND TIME DIRECTED THE LOWER ·COURT TO DO THAT
WHICH THIS COURT HERETOFORE ORDERED, WHICH
ORDER WAS CARRIED OUT BY 'THE LOWER COURT BUT
NOT COMPLIED ·wiTH BY APPELLANT.
B~,

this decision the court for the second time gives
appellant an opportunit~· to do that whirh appellant failed and refused to do for eight years, during all of which
tin1e respondent was obliged to keep the taxes paid on the
property or lose his interest in the property or the right
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to reimbursement, as wa~ held in the case of Shipp v.
Sheffield, 117 P. 2d 996, 101 Utah 5±. In the original
case the court directed the lower court to determine the
amount due, which the lower court did, and which the
appellant failed to pay but tried to avoid hy having the
case dis1nissed and by 1naking a 1notion to quiet title without reimburse1nent. Appellant has failed and refused to
comply with that order.
The effect of the decision of this court as herein
handed down simply repeats that decision heretofore
handed down by this court with the adding thereto a
time element, failing in which the court is empowered to
do that which Judge Hansen found should be done in
granting respondents motion for dismissal. From that
order this appeal was taken.
None of the motions made by appellant prior to that
filed after respondents' nwtion to dismiss, ever requested
the court to permit appellant to pay the taxes. And that
motion filed after respondents' Inotion to dismiss requested nothing that had not already been detennined
by the court when the case was remanded.
In Bolognese v. Auder~un, 90 P.
this court held as follows:

~d

275, 97 Utah 136,

"So far as the tax proceedings are concerned
we are convinced that the facts now disclosed by
the record remain essentially the same as the)'
appeared when the case was here before. Such
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being the case we are precluded from again passing on a question which was presented, considered,
and passed upon before by this court, by force of
the doctrine of the law of the case. 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, page 1499, 1508, 1964, and cases
there cited. See also Forbes v. Butler, 73 rtah
522, 275 P. 772; etah State National Bank v. Livingston, 74 Utah 456, 280 P. 327; Clark v. Los
Angeles & S.L.R. Co., 73 l~tah 486, 275 P. 582;
Grow v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 47 Utah 26,150
P. 970."

POINT VIII
THE SUPREME COURT HAS SUBSTITUTED ITS DISCRETION FOR THE DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT.

The court states that the only question to be determined is whether the trial court abused its discretion
in dismissing the action under Rule 41 (b). But the
court does not appear to accord the trial court's discretion the presumption of vailidity. The Supren1e Court
does not in its opinion examine the appellant's contentions as to \dl~' the trial court grossly abused its discretion. The supre1ne (_ ~ourt, instead of presu1ning the valid
exercise of discretion by the trial ronrt, appears to presume just the opposite, stating:
"It is re . . poJI(tellt's contentions that the court
did not abuse its discretion in disn1issing with
prejnoi<·P appellant's action under the provisions
of Rule 41 (b) . . . etc."
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The court then ruled against respondents' contentions. It decided that the appellant should have one last
clear chance to 1nake reimbursement; but that if appellant "should fail to make such payn1ent within 30 days
its action shall be dismissed with prejudice."
Respondents submit: This appears to be an exercise of discretion by the Supreme Court instead of acceptance of the discretion exercised by the trial court.
Respondents further submit that it was an erroneus
execise of discretion. It appears to provide a standard
that before a claim may be dismissed, the plaintiff should
be given one last clear chance to prosecute his claim.
Such a standard appears inconsistent with the authorities cited by respondents holding that activity by a plaintiff after a motion to disrniss has been nmde, comes too
late. Page 13 Respondents' Brief.
Respondents respectfully submit: The discretion
exercised by the trial court was not an abuse of discretion because in this case the appellant delayed prosecution for eight years and declared its intention not to
prosecute by moving to dismiss its claim. Respondents
submit that this discretion should not be disturbed by
the Supreme Court, regardless of how the Supreme Court
would have ruled, had it sat in judgment in the trial
court.
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Respondents respectfully submit that a re-hearing
should be granted.
Respectfully subrnitted,
MILTON

v.

BACKMAN

wILLIAM H. HENDERSON
GOLDEN w. ROBBINS
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